ABSTRACT The latest trends in spectrum trading allow secondary users (SUs) to employ hybrid access models and exploit bandwidth employing either opportunistic spectrum access or exclusive spectrum access of vacant frequency bands (FBs) leased for exclusive usage. In this paper, the spectrum trading problem is addressed in an operational framework, where a primary spectrum owner (PSO) allocates specific FBs to a number of primary users (PUs) and at the same time allows SUs belonging to multiple service classes to operate opportunistically in a part of the spectrum primarily allocated to the PU operation. By offering exclusive bandwidth-price contracts to SUs in FBs, which are excluded from the PU access, the PSO expects additional revenue. In this framework, the PSO aims at maximizing its revenue through optimal contract design that considers the multiple SU service classes, about which the PSO may have at its disposal either complete or incomplete information. In the first case, it is proven that only one type of contract destined for the highest SU service class is profitable to the PSO. In the second case, two heuristic algorithms are proposed for the optimal contract design corresponding to offering a single contract or multiple contracts to various service classes. The simulation results for the complete and incomplete information cases have been examined with regard to the SU service classes and the number and transmission specifications of the PUs. The two proposed algorithms manage to address the incomplete information case and be close to the optimal values obtained when complete information is available. Finally, the social welfare, as the aggregate expected utility of all parties involved, is examined.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) improves spectrum efficiency by implementing Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) [1] where cognitive users operate as Secondary Users (SUs) in Frequency Bands (FBs) originally allocated to primary users (PUs), in the attempt to enhance the exploitation of under-utilized FBs. Relevant standardization already exists, e.g. IEEE 802.22 [2] and ECMA-392 [3] .
An emerging research area related to CR networks is spectrum trading. In spectrum trading problems, the PUs or the Primary Spectrum Owners (PSOs) appear as sellers and the SUs as buyers. Depending on the formulation of the problem, spectrum is traded against money or other resources. Reference [4] presents various mechanisms and approaches related to spectrum trading.
Currently, several theories have been used to address spectrum trading problems, among them, pricing, auction, contract and game theory. Game theory has been extensively used to determine equilibria in various problems related to spectrum pricing. In [5] , spectrum pricing is analyzed through a Bertrand game model in an oligopoly market consisting of multiple primary service providers. Leasing vacant FBs primarily destined for PUs is examined through a two-level dynamic game framework in [6] . Replicator dynamics is applied for service selection at the lower level, whereas a spectrum leasing differential game is applied for the spectrum brokers competition at the upper level. In game theory approaches, the utility of every party (player) involved is assumed known to the other players. However, when complete information for the evaluation of the resources is not available, auction might be appropriate. In [7] , an auction-based spectrum trading method is employed to maximize both the aggregate SU satisfaction and the PU revenue. A repeated auction with Bayesian nonparametric learning for spectrum access in CR networks is presented in [8] .
When different levels of information are available to the parties involved, effective mechanisms can be provided through contract theory. A contract-based approach is examined in [9] by designing incentive schemes appropriate for cooperative spectrum sharing. In [10] , a contract-based spectrum sharing mechanism is proposed where the SUs relay the PU traffic in exchange for dedicated/exclusive spectrum access time under either complete or incomplete information. In [11] , spectrum trading is treated in a monopoly market employing appropriate quality-price contracts. The shortterm secondary trading in a hybrid spectrum market making use of stochastic network information is investigated in [12] , targeting at the maximization of the PSO expected profit. Long-term and short-term markets between a PSO and multiple SUs have been studied in [13] employing a contract theoretic model and a Stackelberg game model, respectively. Finally, in [14] , a contract design problem is examined where a primary license holder aims at exploiting its excessive spectrum capacity by leasing it to SUs.
The previous works addressed the spectrum sharing issue considering a specific SU access method based either on the ''Hierarchical Access Model'' or on the ''Exclusive Use Model'' [15] . Lately, several research works have investigated the SUs capability of selecting either of the two access options. In [16] , the SUs are allowed either to lease spectrum or to use the PU bands opportunistically for free. The relevant analysis is based on queueing theory and results in a Nash Equilibrium (NE) when the SUs have only one option as to the access mode they will employ. The dynamic behavior of network users joining either as SUs or as PUs and the respective pricing policies have been examined in [17] using a simple M/M/1 queue model employing replicator dynamics and optimization theory. Both opportunistic DSA and dedicated DSA have been considered in [18] , where the pricing competition has been examined for base stations belonging either to cooperative or to competitive operators giving rise to a Stackelberg game. A two-stage spectrum access selection and pricing game is presented in [19] , where the SUs choose between Opportunistic Spectrum Access (OSA) and Exclusive Spectrum Access (ESA) with the respective operators setting the optimal prices to maximize the utilities at the equilibrium network state.
Following the latest trend toward using combined models, this work proposes a money-exchange spectrum trading scheme, in a framework where the PSO offers exclusive spectrum access to PUs under specific service level agreements (SLAs) and may exploit a part of the available spectrum by offering to SUs contracts in the form of bandwidth-prize pairs. In this framework, through appropriately designed contracts, the SUs are allowed to operate in FBs excluded from PU operation. Employing OSA, the SUs can also use vacant FBs primarily destined for PU operation. Optimal contract design that maximizes the PSO profit is investigated under either complete or incomplete information about the SU transmission characteristics and requirements. Two heuristic algorithms are proposed for the incomplete information case, namely the single-contract and the multicontract algorithm, and their performance is compared to the optimal results obtained in the complete information case.
The paper is organized as follows. The system model and the utility functions of the PSO and the SUs are presented in Section II. In Section III, the contract design is analyzed. Optimal contract design for the complete information case is proposed in Section IV. In Section V, dealing with the incomplete information case, the two heuristic algorithms are proposed. Simulation results for both the complete and incomplete information cases are presented and discussed in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A PSO is considered having agreed identical SLAs with a number of PUs. These SLAs specify the data rate, the target bit-error-rate (BER), and the occupation probability of the FBs guaranteed to the PUs. In the same geographical area, N SUs are allowed to access the same spectrum. Depending on the type of access offered to the SUs, the total available bandwidth B is divided into two parts, namely B OSA and B ESA . In B OSA , the SUs can operate only opportunistically in vacant FBs which are primarily allocated to PUs. In B ESA , the SUs are allowed to operate exclusively depending on the contract they have agreed with the PSO. Denoting by contract ω n = {b n , π n } a pair of allocated bandwidth b n and price π n , the system model under consideration is schematically given in Fig. 1 . 
A. SECONDARY USERS ACCESS MODEL
In the above framework, the SUs are assumed to experience different transmission conditions. According to [5] and [20] , the transmission rate enjoyed by SU n when it accesses bandwidth X is given from
where
is the spectral efficiency characterizing SU n and
is the QoS specified for SU n as determined by the respective target BER, BER tar n [5] , [20] . In (2), SNR n , i.e the signalto-noise ratio at the decoder input of SU n , depends on the respective channel conditions and the noise temperature of the SU n receiver.
Assuming that all the SUs and all the PUs are characterized by the same target BER, say BER tar SU and BER tar PU respectively, the various service classes offered to the SUs and the PUs are determined by the respective minimum transmission rates required. In this framework, service classes are defined for the N SUs corresponding to equal in number minimum transmission rates, R i,min , i = 1, 2, · · · . Each of the N SUs belongs to one of the service classes available. Indicatively, if SU n belongs to service class i, the transmission rate offered to it by the PSO must exceed R i,min , that is R n ≥ R i,min . Assuming that all SUs belonging to the same service class are offered the same contract, hence the same bandwidth share, the service classes, which are characterized by the requested transmission rate, may be equivalently characterized by the corresponding spectral efficiency. In this respect, the service classes are equivalently defined by the requested spectral density, namely = {φ 1 , φ 2 , .., φ } with φ 1 < φ 2 < .. < φ . Each service class φ λ , λ ∈ {1, .., }, comprises N λ SUs, where λ=1 N λ = N .
As the M PUs are assumed identical, they all belong to a single service class characterized by
where K PU = 1.5/ln(0.2/BER tar PU ) and SNR PU is the SNR at the decoder input of any PU which is also dependent on the channel conditions and the noise temperature of the PU receiver.
As already stated, the SUs may access the spectrum both opportunistically in B OSA and exclusively in B ESA . Assuming that SU i agrees on a contract ω i = {b i , π i }, i = 1, 2, · · · , N , with the PSO, the total bandwidth B is divided into
and
Hence, the aggregate bandwidth available to SU n is
where p occ is the probability that B OSA is occupied by PUs leaving no FBs available for opportunistic access. Based on (7), the cost of SU n is given from (8) where π n is the price paid for exclusively accessing b n and π OSA is the cost of the SUs per unit of opportunistically accessed bandwidth induced due to spectrum sensing. Combining (1), (7) and (8), the net utility of an SU is given from
is the net utility of SU n employing ESA to a fixed bandwidth b n and
is the net utility of SU n employing OSA in B OSA . Overall, SU n may exploit a total bandwidth B n by agreeing on a contract for exclusive access to bandwidth b n to enjoy utility U ESA n (B n ) and by opportunistically accessing B OSA to enjoy utility U OSA n (B n ).
B. THE PRICING MODEL
The PSO provides spectrum access to M PUs at a guaranteed minimum transmission data rate, say R PU . At the same time, the PSO provides exclusive bandwidth shares b i , i = 1, .., N , to N SUs through appropriate contracts ω i = {b i , π i }. The aggregate PSO revenue received by providing exclusive access to N SUs belonging to service classes through the set of contracts = {(b λ , π λ ), ∀λ ∈ {1, .., }} is given from
On the other hand, the exclusion of B ESA from PU operation may degrade the PUs transmission rate. In case the PSO cannot provide the agreed data rate R PU to the PUs, it must compensate them for service degradation. The relevant PSO cost is related to the PU service degradation via
is the transmission rate degradation induced to PUs because the PSO allows N SUs to exclusively operate in the B ESA bandwidth through the set of contracts . Taking into account (12), (13) and (14), the net PSO utility is given from
III. CONTRACT DESIGN A. DESIGN CONSTRAINTS
In the contract design problem related to the pricing model analyzed in Sec. II-B, the PSO designs the contracts and the SUs operate as agents that may agree on the contract appropriate for their operation. The PSO goal is to maximize U P ( ) by offering optimal contracts ω * λ = {b * λ , π * λ }, λ = 1, .., , to each service class. The set of optimal contracts * = {(b * λ , π * λ ), ∀λ ∈ {1, .., }} must comply with the feasibility constraints as defined in contract theory. These constraints are.
1) PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINT (PC)
A set of contracts satisfies the participation constraint if, by accepting the respective contracts, all agents receive non negative utility.
To satisfy this constraint for all service classes offered, the relevant contracts must guarantee that
2) INCENTIVE CONSTRAINT (IC)
A set of contracts satisfies the incentive constraint if an agent cannot receive higher utility by accepting a contract different from the one destined for its service class.
For an agent belonging to service class φ λ , satisfies the incentive constraint if
3) INCENTIVE FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINT (IFC)
A set of contracts is incentive feasible if it satisfies both the participation and incentive constraints, that is, it satisfies both (16) and (17) .
Employing the preceding constraints, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a feasible contract design in a set of contracts = {(b λ , π λ ), ∀λ ∈ {1, .., }}, destined for SUs that belong to a set of service classes
The prices satisfy the following relationships:
(18) Conditions 1-3 constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the design of feasible contracts over . Their proofs are given in Appendix A.
B. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN
An optimal contract design for the combined bandwidth allocation and pricing problem under consideration yields the highest utility for the PSO. Taking into consideration the feasibility constraints referred to in Sec. III, the PSO utility maximization problem is formulated as follows:
∀λ, j ∈ {1, .., }.
Theorem 4:
In a set of feasible contracts = {(b λ , π λ ), ∀λ ∈ {1, .., }}, where the bandwidth shares b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n allocated to the corresponding service classes are fixed, the optimal prices {π * 1 , π * 2 , .., π * } are determined from (see Appendix B)
The next sections deal with the optimization problem in hand assuming different levels of available information with regard to the service class the various SUs belong to.
IV. OPTIMAL PRICING UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION
In this case, the PSO knows the service class each SU belongs to. It is expected that the contracts offered by the PSO satisfy the participation constraint (16) with equality. Consequently, π λ in (15) is substituted by b λ ·φ λ , accordingly modifying the objective function appearing in (19) .
As proven in Appendix C, optimal contract design under complete information results in offering contract * = (b * , π * ) to the highest service class only and no contracts to the rest − 1 service classes.
Hence, all the bandwidth destined for exclusive SU access is destined only for the SUs belonging to the highest service class φ , that is
Then, the optimization problem in hand is reduced to an optimization problem with regard to the single variable B ESA = N · b appearing in (27). Specifically,
The above reduced optimization problem is convex with respect to B ESA since the objective function appearing in (28) is concave and the restriction (29) is convex. The Lagrangian is
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier of restriction (29) (µ ≥ 0). The dual problem is
which provides an upper bound for the primal problem.
Since the dual problem is convex, there is a unique optimal pair (B * ESA , µ * ) that satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [21] 
By properly processing (32a), one may obtain the optimal bandwidth allocated to SUs from
Substituting (33) into (32d), one obtains
As µ * cannot be negative, the only acceptable value of µ * is 0.
Concluding, under complete information about which service class each SU belongs to, the PSO offers one bandwidthprice contract, namely the optimal contract (b * , π * ), only to the SUs belonging to the highest service class.
Specifically,
The maximum PSO utility when the PSO offers only the * = (b * , π * ) optimal contract is determined upon substituting (37) into the objective function appearing in (28).
V. OPTIMAL PRICING UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In realistic cognitive networks, complete information may not be available. In such a case, in the attempt to design optimal contracts, the PSO is not aware of which service class each SU belongs to. The only available information is (i) the set of service classes, = {φ 1 , φ 2 , ..., φ }, and (ii) the probabilities the SUs belong to each service class, namely p λ , λ = 1, 2, · · · , , where λ=1 p λ = 1. Then, the PSO utility optimization problem is transformed into a PSO expected utility optimization problem for specific SU service classes. If P{N 1 , N 2 , ..., N } is the joint probability that there are exactly N 1 , N 2 , ..., N SUs that belong to the corresponding service classes, with λ=1 N λ = N , the PSO expected utility is given from (38), as shown at the bottom of this page.
Expressing the joint probability as
and substituting π * λ from (26) into (19) , the optimization problem under incomplete information is formulated as in (40), as shown at the bottom of this page.
This problem cannot be solved analytically. Hence, in order to estimate the optimal contract design * = {(b * λ , π * λ ), ∀λ ∈ }, a heuristic approach will be followed.
First, the optimal pricing problem under incomplete information will be examined. In this case, the PSO offers only one type of contract. As, in this case, only the probability that an SU belongs to a service class is known, in order to maximize its expected utility given from (40), the PSO must select the service class for which the unique contract is destined for. The following procedure is followed:
Step 1: contract design cases are considered, corresponding to offering a single type of contract designed for users belonging to service class φ i . That is, in each of the contract design cases, a single contract
This type of contract will be accepted by all SUs belonging to service classes φ λ with λ ≥ i since all these service classes enjoy positive utility, because according to the Participation Constraint, U ESA
. Thus, subproblems are defined which are easier to solve compared to the general optimization problem formulated via (40). Solving these subproblems, the corresponding optimal types of contracts are determined, namely
The respective optimal expected PSO utilities U * P,i , i = 1, .., , are evaluated by substituting (b * i , π * i ) in the objective function appearing in (40).
Step 2: Among the optimal contracts determined in Step 1, the one yielding the maximum expected U * P is chosen, say contract ω * λ T . In this respect, λ T constitutes a service class threshold as all service classes φ λ , λ ≥ λ T will agree on this contract as they will receive non negative payoff.
The single-contract algorithm (SCA) is given in Algorithm 1. This reflects the loss in PSO utility induced due to the lack of complete information about the exact service class the SUs belong to. To reduce this utility loss, the multi-contract algorithm (MCA) is proposed, according to which the PSO offers multiple contracts to the SUs. In this case, two major issues need to be addressed: i) how many service classes will be offered contracts and ii) how the bandwidth available for ESA will be allocated to these classes.
Having estimated employing SCA the threshold class λ T as well as the respective optimal single contract ω *
. . , }} is defined in the attempt to maximize the PSO expected utility. To determine this set of contracts, optimal bandwidth allocation to the service classes supported should be accomplished. Each service class supported will be offered a specific contract as determined in Algorithm 2. The MCA conforms to the necessary and sufficient conditions 1-3.
Determine the threshold service class λ T and the optimal type of contract ω *
(2) Optimize contract design:
estimate the expected U P,i employing (40). Find the bandwidth share b * i which maximizes the expected PSO utility
as the optimized contract of class i.
VI. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
Numerical results for the contract design proposed in the previous sections are presented both under complete and incomplete information about which service class the SUs belong to. First, the complete information case is examined for a PSO managing a total bandwidth of B = 100MHz having agreed SLAs with M PUs (SNR PU = 15dB, p occ = 0.8 and BER tar PU = 10 −4 ). N SUs belonging to service classes = {φ 1 , φ 2 , .., φ } are allowed to access a part of the available bandwidth through contracts.
The optimal bandwidth percentage allocated to SUs for exclusive access is plotted in Fig.2 with respect to the SNR of the highest available SU service class φ as determined from (2) . Different values of M (50, 100) and R PU (1, 2, 3Mbps) have been examined, whereas BER tar SU is set at 10 −4 . From Fig.2 it is readily observed that the optimal bandwidth allocated to SUs for exclusive access increases with the highest QoS level, namely φ . Higher SU service classes motivate the allocation of more bandwidth to SUs exclusive access, i.e. larger B ESA , because such a choice offers a better spectral efficiency which increases the PSO payoff and it can better counterbalance the cost induced due to the exclusion of PUs from B ESA . From Fig.2 it is also verified that high values of either M or R PU lead to a reduction of B ESA because the relevant cost induced due to not complying with the PU SLAs is high. It can also be observed that in case the highest SU service class is characterized by low SNR values (SNR < 6dB), B * ESA may take negative values, such as when R PU = 3Mbps and M = 100 in Fig.2 . This means that the PSO has no gain by offering ESA and, consequently, no incentive to offer contracts to SUs.
In Fig.3 , the optimal PSO utility is plotted with respect to the SNR of the highest SU service class when the PSO allocates B * ESA to SUs according to (37). It can readily be observed that the optimal PSO utility increases with the highest QoS requested by the SUs since, by offering a single contract only the SUs belonging to the highest service class, a higher bandwidth price can be claimed. Also, as already observed from Fig.2 , the relevant optimal allocated bandwidth B * ESA is larger. On the other hand, the PSO utility decreases either with M or with R PU as an increase in either of them increases the cost of violating the SLAs agreed with the PUs. As it was also observed in Fig. 2 , the PSO utility is negative for very low SNR values. In this case, no contracts are offered to the SUs. Fig. 4 depicts the optimal contract price π * when complete information about the number of SUs that belong to φ , namely N is available. It is readily observed that the optimal price decreases with N since the allocated bandwidth B * ESA must be divided into more parts. Also, the optimal price increases with SNR , hence φ , as both B * ESA and the SUs utility increase with φ . On the other hand, π * decreases with the number of PUs since this number restrains the bandwidth destined for exclusive SU access.
Next, the case of incomplete information is considered. The SUs are assumed to belong to five service classes = {φ 1 , φ 2 , .., φ 5 } = {1.57, 2, 79, 3.44, 4.07, 4.37} corresponding to SNR = {10, 15, 17, 19, 20dB} . The PSO knows only the probabilities the SUs belong to each service class, namely P = {P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P 5 }. The PSO utilities employing SCA and MCA are tabulated in Table 1 under three scenaria. Under the first scenario (Case I), the SUs equiprobably belong to the two lowest service classes, whereas, under the second (Case II), they equiprobably belong to the two highest ones. Under the third scenario (Case III), the SUs equiprobably belong to all the service classes available. The operational PU scenaria where B = 100MHz, M = 30, 50, R PU = 1Mbps, 3Mbps are examined. For the sake of comparison, along with the results obtained under the three scenaria examined, the relevant optimal results are also given, i.e. the results obtained under complete information as to the service class each SU belongs to.
As expected and already observed, the PSO utility always decreases with M and R PU . By offering multiple contracts, MCA allows the PSO to receive a higher payoff compared to SCA where only one contract is offered. However, in CASE I, the PSO utility is the same under both SCA and MCA since, in this case, the optimal contract for both service classes is the same and MCA does not offer any added value. In Case II, both SCA and MCA converge to the optimal PSO payoff values. This should be expected in operational scenaria where the probabilities that the SUs belong to higher service classes are high. In CASE III reflecting a uniform SU distribution to all service classes, the expected PSO utility is far from the optimal one, since it is risky for the PSO to design contracts only for the highest service class as implied by the optimal contract design when complete information is available.
Finally, in Fig.5 , the aggregate expected utility of all parties involved is depicted for different values of M . CASE III is considered (P = (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2)), where the service classes are respectively characterized by SNR = {10, 15, 17, 19, 20dB}, R PU = 3Mbps, N = 100 and p occ = 0.8. The PSO utility, U P , is the expected utility employing SCA and MCA. The SUs utility when employing ESA and OSA is determined from (10) and (11) . Social Welfare I (SW-I) is defined as the utility of all parties involved through ESA and is composed of the PSO utility obtained under contract design MCA and of the SUs utility obtained employing ESA. Social Welfare II (SW-II) is determined by adding to SW-I the SU utility obtained employing OSA. From Fig.5 it is readily observed that all utilities involved decrease with M . As the PSO utility is determined by the revenue received from the SUs, such a reduction is expected since, when the number of PUs is high, less bandwidth can be offered to exclusive SU access through contracts. From Fig.5 it is observed that the gap between the utilities determined employing MCA or SCA decreases with M as more PUs lead to reduced flexibility in designing optimal contracts. Thus, MCA cannot offer contracts that may significantly improve the PSO utility. Also, the gap between SW-I and the PSO utility through obtained applying MCA, which represents U ESA SU , is also decreasing with M . The reason is twofold: first, the bandwidth allocated through contracts decreases with M and, second, the reduced variation in contract design motivates the PSO to design contract pairs destined for higher service classes that maximize its own revenue by minimizing the SUs utility.
Finally, the difference between SW-II and SW-I increases with M due to the increasing U OSA SU . When B ESA decreases due to the high number of PUs, there is more bandwidth available for opportunistic access.
VII. CONCLUSION
Optimal contract design destined for SU exclusive access has been proposed in a framework where a PSO serves a number of PUs under specific SLAs in a certain bandwidth. Both cases of complete and incomplete information with regard to the service classes the SUs belong to are examined. In the complete information case, analytical results are derived for the optimal contract whereas, in the incomplete information case, two heuristic algorithms are proposed, namely SCA and MCA. Simulation results are presented with respect to various system parameters. SCA and MCA exhibit a good performance with regard to the PSO utility compared to the optimal values derived in the complete information case. Finally, the social welfare is examined with regard to the number of PUs.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF CONDITION 1
It must be proven that
A feasible contract complies with the feasibility constraints. Hence, if b i > b j , (17) yields:
Also, if π i > π j :
It is easy to verify that equalities in prices are valid when the respective bandwidth shares are equal.
PROOF OF CONDITION 2
The incentive compatibility constraint (17) implies that:
Combining the above relationships:
Hence, if φ i > φ j then b i ≥ b j .
PROOF OF CONDITION 3
Applying (18) for λ = 1, one obtains:
Considering the left hand side of (16) which is the incentive constraint.
The same applies for the right hand side of (16) 
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 4
From (15) it is evident that U PSO is increasing with π λ , λ = 1, · · · , . Suppose there exists another set of prices {π λ }, λ ∈ {1, .., } for which the PSO utility is higher. Then, 
which violates (16) . Thus, {π * 1 , π * 2 , .., π * }, is the optimal price setting.
APPENDIX C
When only one contract is offered to service class , the PSO utility is
When more contracts are offered, U P is given by
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Then, it should be proven that U P ≥ U P . The total allocated bandwidth in both cases should be the same, thus,
As such,
Hence,
since φ ≥ φ λ , ∀λ ∈ {1, .., }, which leads to U P ≥ U P .
